The role of conscious cognitive processes in human affective conditioning remains controversial, with several theories arguing that such conditioning can occur without awareness of the conditioned stimulus (CS)-unconditioned stimulus (UCS) contingency. One specific type of affective conditioning in which unaware conditioning is said to occur is "evaluative conditioning." The present experiment tested the role of contingency awareness by embedding an evaluative conditioning paradigm in a distracting masking task while obtaining, in addition to subjective ratings of affect, both psychophysiological (skin conductance and startle eyeblink) and indirect behavioral (affective priming) measures of conditioning, along with a trial-by-trial measure of awareness from 55 college student participants. Aware participants showed conditioning with all of the measures; unaware participants failed to show conditioning with all measures. The behavioral, neurophysiological, and therapeutic implications of these findings are discussed.
Human affective responses (e.g., fear and valence) can be elicited by formerly neutral stimuli on the basis of prior associative learning. In fact, this is a postulated mechanism of learned phobias (Field, 2006) , dietary preferences (Booth, Mather, & Fuller, 1982) , and many of our acquired likes and dislikes. The associative learning process is considered a form of Pavlovian affective classical conditioning.
Human affective classical conditioning is usually considered to occur on at least two distinct levels that obey different laws and have different neural circuits (for an early discussion, see Razran, 1955 , and for more contemporary treatments see Baeyens, Crombez, Hendrickx, & Eelen, 1995; LeDoux, 1994; Ö hman & Mineka, 2001 ). One level is conscious relational learning in which subjects learn and can verbalize the conditioned stimulusunconditioned stimulus (CS-UCS) contingency. The second level occurs preattentively, independently of conscious awareness of the stimulus contingencies. According to these models, affective conditioning occurs quickly and is mediated by evolutionarily old neural circuits, whereas conscious cognition occurs subsequent to the conditioned emotion and its likely role is to simply rationalize the emotion (Ö hman & Mineka, 2001) .
Upon close inspection, the evidence in support of the levels of learning hypothesis of human affective conditioning is equivocal at best. In fact, contrary to this hypothesis, most studies of human affective classical conditioning have found that it occurs only in subjects aware of the CS-UCS contingency (see reviews by Brewer, 1974; Dawson & Schell, 1985; Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Shanks & St. John, 1994) .
Studies that find evidence of conditioning only in aware subjects frequently employ a distracting task that requires subjects to attend to individual CSs and UCSs but prevents them from becoming aware of the CS-UCS relation. Such tasks are designed to insure that any effects of the lack of awareness on conditioning cannot be attributed to the subject's failure to attend to the CSs. For example, subjects are told that they are participating in a perception test and their task is to detect the highest and lowest tones on each trial of a series of tones (Dawson, 1970) . They are also told that electric shock will occasionally be presented to alter their physiological arousal while skin conductance will be measured as the index of arousal. Thus, subjects are given an elaborate and convincing cover story regarding the presentation of the CSϩ (high pitch tones paired with the UCS) and CSϪ (low pitch tones not paired with the UCS), the UCS (electric shock), and the measure of conditioning (skin conductance). Despite the fact that a specific tone (CSϩ) is consistently associated with an aversive shock (UCS), conditioning of autonomic responses in the distracting task fails to occur among unaware subjects. Not only do the unaware subjects fail to condition, but if the development of awareness is measured on a trial-by-trial basis the aware subjects show conditioning only on trials after they became aware (Biferno & Dawson, 1977; Dawson & Biferno, 1973; Ö hman, Ellström, & Björkstrand, 1976) . Results such as these fail to support the levels of learning hypothesis; rather, they are consistent with the theoretical view that human affective conditioning requires conscious awareness of the CS-UCS contingency (Davey, 1992; Dawson, 1973; Dawson & Furedy, 1976; Dawson & Schell, 1985; Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Ö hman, 1983) .
However, there is some suggestive evidence that a specific type of human affective conditioning may occur without contingency awareness, referred to as "evaluative conditioning" (De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001) . The prototypical evaluative conditioning paradigm, the so-called "picture-picture" paradigm, involves the presentation of a series of pictures, some previously rated as affectively neutral, positive, or negative. The pictures are presented so that specific neutral pictures (CS pos ) are always followed by affectively positive pictures (UCS pos ), whereas other neutral pictures (CS neg ) are always followed by negative pictures (UCSneg ). The typical result is that the formerly neutral CS pos pictures are rated subjectively more positively following conditioning, whereas the formerly neutral CS neg pictures are rated more negatively than before conditioning. Several studies have argued that evaluative conditioning is a unique form of affective associative learning that can occur without contingency awareness Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001; Hammerl & Fulcher, 2005) . The strength of this argument about awareness will be considered further in the Discussion section.
One potent criticism of the evaluative conditioning paradigm is that basing the measure of conditioning on self-report is clearly vulnerable to demand characteristics. That is, subjects may rate the CS paired with negative pictures more negatively following the conditioning session simply because they believe that is what the experimenter wants. In order to use measures of conditioning that are less susceptible to demand characteristics, more recent studies have employed less obtrusive behavioral measures and psychophysiological measures of conditioning rather than, or in addition to, verbal ratings.
An unobtrusive behavioral measure used to index affective evaluative conditioning is the affective priming paradigm (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986) . This paradigm, when used as a measure of evaluative conditioning, employs the CS paired with negative pictures (CS neg ) and the CS paired with positive pictures (CS pos ) as prime stimuli followed by target stimuli (typically words with positive or negative valence). Subjects are asked to evaluate the target stimuli by saying either "positive" or "negative" as quickly as possible. Results showed that the response latency to evaluate negative targets was significantly shorter when CS neg served as the prime, compared to when the CS pos served as the prime, and the opposite was true for positive primes (De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 1998; Hermans, Vansteenwegen, Crombez, Baeyens, & Eelen, 2002) . Of note, the priming effects were found with a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of 300 ms but not with an SOA of 1000 ms between prime and target (Hermans, Spruyt, & Eelen, 2003) . Although subjects were aware of the correct CS-UCS contingency in these studies, the fact that affective conditioning was found with an unobtrusive behavioral measure, and found with only a short SOA, suggests that the conditioning was not due to demand characteristics (however, see De Houwer, 2006) .
The psychophysiological measure frequently used in past affective conditioning studies has been the skin conductance response. However, it has more recently been argued that the proper psychophysiological measure of human affective conditioning, particularly aversive conditioning, is the acoustic startle eyeblink response . The startle response in humans and lower animals has been shown to be potentiated when startle stimuli are presented in the presence of CSs previously paired with shock (Putnam & Vanman, 1999) . Hamm and Vaitl (1996) reported an interesting dissociation between startle potentiation and skin conductance in a differential conditioning paradigm where one picture (CSϩ) was paired with an electric shock UCS whereas another picture (CSϪ) was never paired with shock. Potentiation of the startle response was greater following CSϩ than CSϪ independently of whether subjects were rated aware or unaware of the stimulus contingency, whereas skin conductance was greater following CSϩ than CSϪ only in the aware subjects. As the authors noted, however, one weakness of this study is that awareness was measured with a questionnaire administered after an extinction phase, and therefore it may have failed to detect some of the subjects who were aware during conditioning but who may have unlearned or forgotten the correct stimulus contingency during the extinction phase. Purkis and Lipp (2001) also measured skin conductance and startle potentiation during differential affective conditioning while subjects participated in a challenging distracting masking task. Using a "visual memory test" introduced by Dawson, Schell, and Banis (1986) , participants were asked to memorize a series of pictures on each trial. Participants were also told that an electric shock stimulus would be presented from time to time and they were to indicate whether they expected this stimulus on a trial-bytrial basis using a dial and pointer device. The aversive shock stimulus served as the UCS and followed offset of one of the pictures (CSϩ). Like Hamm and Vaitl, Purkis and Lipp found skin conductance conditioning only among the aware subjects. Unlike Hamm and Vaitl, Purkis and Lipp found startle potentiation conditioning also only with the aware subjects. Moreover, among aware subjects, startle potentiation conditioning occurred only after the onset of awareness. They also found evaluative conditioning in the form of changes in affective ratings of the CSϩ and CSϪ only in aware subjects. A shortcoming of this experiment is the small sample of unaware subjects (n ϭ 7), but nevertheless the results fail to support the previous finding of unaware affective conditioning of startle blink in the absence of awareness. More recently, Jovanovic et al. (2006) also used a trial-by-trial expectancy measure of awareness during acquisition and found that unaware subjects failed to show discrimination conditioning of startle, unlike aware subjects. All in all, there are conflicting results regarding unaware conditioning as indexed by the startle eyeblink measure of conditioning.
The present experiment tested for aware and unaware conditioning employing the evaluative conditioning "picture-picture" paradigm (neutral pictures as CSs and affective pictures as UCSs) with both startle eyeblink and skin conductance indices of conditioning in the context of a distracting masking task and with a trial-by-trial measure of awareness obtained during conditioning. We also used the affective priming paradigm as an unobtrusive behavioral measure of affective conditioning in addition to subjects' self-ratings of the valence of the CS pos paired with a positive picture and CS neg paired with a negative picture. In this way we were able to use sensitive psychophysiological measures along with unobtrusive behavioral measures of evaluative conditioning, coupled with sensitive concurrent and postconditioning measures of contingency awareness, in an effort to enhance the possibilities of demonstrating the elusive lower unaware level of conditioning.
Method

Participants
Sixty-six volunteers from the University of Southern California subject pool served as subjects. The number of subjects providing data for each dependent variable varied somewhat, for reasons explained in the Dependent Variables section.
Procedures
The experiment consisted of six phases in the following sequence: stimulus selection, conditioning, affective priming, affective ratings, assessment of awareness, and extinction.
1. Stimulus selection. Participants viewed a series of 32 black and white pictures of human faces showing happy, neutral, and angry expressions on a computer screen and were asked to evaluate them on a pleasant-unpleasant scale (Ϫ100 ϭ very unpleasant; 0 ϭ neutral; ϩ100 ϭ very pleasant). The experimenter stressed that they should rely on their first, spontaneous reaction toward the picture. To get a sense of the full range of the pictures the participants were shown the entire set on the computer screen one at a time prior to rating them. After all 32 pictures were evaluated, the subject was asked to sit quietly in a separate subject room. Meanwhile, the experimenter selected five pictures with a rating closest to "0." The two pictures of the same gender rated closest to "0" were selected as CS pos and CS neg . The mean preconditioning rating of CS pos was 0.62 (range ϭ Ϫ12 to ϩ 20) and the mean rating of CS neg was 0.18 (range ϭ Ϫ11 to ϩ 19). The three remaining pictures served as neutral stimuli (CS neut ), not paired with a UCS during the conditioning phase.
2. Conditioning. Participants were seated 100 cm from the computer screen in a comfortable chair and were told that they were to participate in a "visual memory test." The "visual memory test" consisted of 20 trials, each of which consisted of a sequence of pictures of the faces previously rated, 10 of which included CS pos paired with UCS pos and 10 of which included CS neg paired with UCS neg . The duration of each picture on each trial was 5 s and there were no gaps between the pictures. Figure 1 shows an example of both a CS neg and a CS pos trial. Each trial consisted of the following sequence: three neutral pictures (CS neut ) were presented semirandomly followed by either the CS pos or CS neg , then a positive or negative affect picture, followed by a blank slide, and finally one of the neutral pictures was presented a second time. Following each CS neg the affectively negative picture of an injured woman (UCS neg ) was presented. Following each CS pos the affectively positive picture of a baby was presented. The trials that included CS pos and CS neg were presented in semirandom order, with no more than two consecutive trials of either CS type. When the last picture of each trial was presented the participants were asked to report the order in which the repeated picture was originally presented (e.g., first, second, third, or fourth).
Participants were told that the purpose of the positive and negative picture presented before they reported was to raise their Figure 1 . Example of a conditioning trial with CS neg followed by UCS neg (top) and CS pos followed by UCS pos (bottom) embedded in a "visual memory test". arousal level to see if that would affect their "visual memory." They were also told that merely expecting a positive or negative picture could affect their "visual memory" and therefore they were asked to express their expectancies by pressing one of five buttons on a box at all times during a trial. They were informed that the buttons corresponded from left to right to "definitely expect the injured woman," "expect the injured woman but are unsure," "completely unsure which," "expect the baby but are unsure," and "definitely expect the baby." The button expectancy data were used to classify subjects as either "aware" or "unaware," in conjunction with the postconditioning questionnaire, and to identify the subjects' point of onset of awareness of the CS pos and CS neg contingency pairings.
CS
The purpose of the "visual memory task" was to mask the contingency between the CS pos and CS neg and the pictures of the baby and injured woman, respectively. This task proved so effective in preventing contingency awareness that pilot data indicated that in order to get approximately a 50% rate of awareness it was necessary to add a "hint" to the instructions that stated: "I can now tell you that the negative and positive pictures are predictable. You will probably learn during the task how the two emotional pictures are predictable, and this should affect your expectancy expressed with the button box."
3. Affective priming. Following the conditioning phase, the experimenter explained that pairs of stimuli would be presented on the computer screen, of which the first would be a picture of a face, while the second would be a word. The participants were instructed to attend to the word and to evaluate it as quickly as possible by pressing a button indicating "positive" or a button indicating "negative." The participants were told they could look at the picture, but that their attention should be directed at the word for which a response had to be given. The experimenter explained that the pictures (primes) were only presented to make the task more difficult.
The primes consisted of the CS neut , CS pos , and CS neg pictures employed in the conditioning phase. The affective priming task consisted of 48 trials, preceded by eight practice trials. Each trial began with a warning tone (200 ms, 1000 Hz) followed by the presentation of the prime picture for a duration of 200 ms. The target word was presented 100 ms (SOA 300 ms) after the offset of the prime. The target stayed on the screen until the participant gave a response or until 2000 ms elapsed. The intertrial interval was 2000 ms. During the task, all 48 combinations of the four primes (CS neg , CS pos , and two CS neuts ) and 12 targets (six positive and six negative words) were presented once. The participants' mean reaction time was recorded in milliseconds. These procedures were patterned after those of Hermans et al. (2002 Hermans et al. ( , 2003 .
4. Affective ratings. Following the affective priming procedure the subjects viewed the five pictures of human faces presented during conditioning (the three CS neuts plus the CS pos and the CS neg ) on a computer screen and were asked to evaluate them a second time on the pleasant-unpleasant scale. It was stressed that they should rely on their first, spontaneous reaction toward the picture.
5. Assessment of awareness. Participants were shown the five neutral pictures presented during conditioning and asked to indicate whether one of the five pictures usually preceded the picture of the injured woman (or cute baby), or whether it was not systematic, or they could not tell. The participants were then asked to indicate the degree of certainty of their answer (i.e., completely uncertain, fairly uncertain, fairly certain, completely certain). This type of recognition questionnaire has been demonstrated to be a valid measure of awareness (Dawson & Reardon, 1973) . Although we believe it is extremely important to administer this questionnaire as shortly as possible following conditioning, we felt it more important to test affective priming and affective ratings as close to the conditioning session as possible, especially since we also had a trial-by-trial measures of awareness in the present experiment.
6. Extinction. Participants were presented 16 trials of the same "visual memory test" that was used during acquisition in which the CS pos and CS neg were each presented eight times, but the UCSs were no longer presented. Participants were informed that the baby and injured woman UCS pictures would no longer be presented and that they therefore no longer had to express their expectancies. They were also told that a brief loud noise (the startle probe) would now be occasionally presented but they were not to let this interfere with their visual memory task. An auditory startle-eliciting probe was presented during four presentations of CS neut , four CS pos , four CS neg , and four times during the intertrial intervals.
Stimulus Materials
The positive and negative UCS pictures were taken from the International Affective Picture System, slides 2070 and 3051, respectively (Lang, Ö hman, & Vaitl, 1988) . The neutral pictures used as CS pos , CS neg , and CS neut were selected from a set of 32 black and white pictures of human faces (Martinez & Benavente, 1998) . Half of the pictures in this set were faces of men while the other half were of women. Pictures varied in the age of the portrayed persons and in their affective expression (i.e., six positive, six negative, 20 neutral). Target words for the affective priming procedure were a fixed set of six positive (e.g., "success") and six negative (e.g., "death") English nouns. The acoustic startle stimulus presented during extinction was a burst of broadband 105 dB (A) white noise, presented binaurally through Telephonics TDH-50P headphones for 50 ms, with a near instantaneous rise and fall time. Decibel levels were measured with a Realistic sound level meter using a Quest Electronics earphone coupler. Stimulus presentation and data acquisition were controlled through Contact Precision Instruments equipment and a computer running SAM1 software.
Dependent Variables
Awareness of CS-UCS contingencies. Participants were categorized as either aware or unaware based on their responses to both the button expectancy task during conditioning as well as the recognition postconditioning questionnaire. To meet criteria on the postconditioning questionnaire participants had to correctly choose the CS pos picture as preceding the positive (baby) UCS and the CS neg picture as preceding the negative (injured woman) UCS and be "fairly certain" or "completely certain" of their answers. To meet criteria with the button expectancy task participants had to correctly express expectancy for both the negative and positive UCS for three sequential trials without further incorrect responses. Furthermore, the participants had to show a change in their button expectancy upon the presentation of the CS pos or CS neg . The point of the onset of awareness was calculated from button responses (i.e., the trial on which correct responses were made with no subsequent incorrect responses). The data of 10 participants who failed to meet the criteria of consistent classification (e.g., expressing awareness with one measure but not another) and one participant for whom button data were missing were excluded from the analyses, leaving a sample of 55 participants (41 females and 14 males).
Affective ratings. To measure the effects of conditioning, the differences in affective ratings were computed between the preconditioning ratings and the postconditioning ratings for CS pos , CS neg , and the mean of the three CS neut .
Skin conductance during conditioning. Skin conductance responses were recorded from the volar surface of the distal phalanges of the first and second fingers of the nondominant hand using 10 mm silver-silver chloride electrodes and a 0.05 molar NaCl paste (see Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2007) . The skin conductance orienting responses were scored as the largest responses beginning between one and three seconds following onset of the CS pos , CS neg , and CS neut stimuli. In order to select the CS neut to score on each trial, we randomly selected five of the CS neut stimuli that appeared in the second position and five that appeared in the third position. Thus, a total of 10 responses to each CS type (CS pos , CS neg , and CS neut ) were averaged over the conditioning trials for each participant. The skin conductance data of three participants were excluded due to the complete absence of skin conductance responding to the UCSs, leaving a sample of 52 usable participants, 26 aware and 26 unaware. Lack of responding to the UCSs suggests that the UCSs were inadequate to produce skin conductance conditioning in these subjects.
To measure the temporal relationship between the onsets of awareness and skin conductance conditioning, further analyses were conducted for evidence of conditioning on the preaware trials and the postaware trials. Preawareness was defined for CS pos and CS neg individually as the three trials prior to awareness of the CS neg Ϫ UCS neg and the CS pos -UCS pos contingency respectively, as expressed by the button expectancies. Postawareness trials were defined as the three pairs of trials after which the participant became aware. The skin conductance responses to CS pos , CS neg , and CS neut were averaged across the pre and post aware trials separately. Of the 26 aware participants, only 13 had at least three preaware trials, whereas the others became aware too early to be included in the temporal analyses.
Skin conductance during extinction. The mean magnitudes of the skin conductance responses to CS pos , CS neg , and CS neut stimuli were computed over the first half and second half (eight trials) of the extinction phase separately, averaging the four CS pos responses, four CS neg responses, and four CS neut responses.
Affective priming. The mean reaction times (in ms) were calculated based on the combination of the valence of the prime picture and the valence of the target words, resulting in three variables: (1) congruent (CS pos with positive target and CS neg with negative target), (2) incongruent (CS pos with negative target and CS neg with positive target) and (3) neutral (CS neut with negative or positive target). Due to equipment malfunction, the data of three participants were excluded from these analyses, leaving a sample of 52 usable participants, 25 aware and 27 unaware.
Startle response. Startle eyeblink was measured as electromyographic (EMG) activity from two miniature Ag-AgCl electrodes (4 mm in diameter) placed over the orbicularis oculi muscle of the left eye, one centered below the pupil and the other approximately 1 cm lateral to the first. The impedance between the two electrodes was measured and deemed acceptable if below 10 K⍀, preferably below 5 K⍀. A larger (8 mm) Ag-AgCl electrode was placed behind the subject's left ear to serve as a ground.
The raw EMG (filtered at 20 Hz high pass and 500 Hz low pass) was collected continuously throughout the session at a rate of 1000 Hz. The data were stored and exported for analysis in microvolt values. For analysis, the EMG was software integrated using a 20 ms time constant. Startle response onset was detected within a window of 20 -120 ms following the startle stimulus onset while peak activity was recorded within a window of 20 -200 ms.
The mean amplitudes of startle eyeblink elicited during CS pos , CS neg and CS neut stimuli were calculated for the first and second halves of the extinction phase and these values utilized in all subsequent analyses. Data from seven participants were lost due to equipment error or to the subject not completing the experiment due to sustained impedance levels above 10 K⍀. Data from an additional seven participants were lost due to nonresponding (a response of less than 1 V) to the half or more of the startle eliciting stimuli presented during the intertrial intervals. This left a final sample of 41 participants with usable startle eyeblink data, 16 aware and 25 unaware.
Hypotheses and data analyses. The hypotheses concerned whether evaluative conditioning occurred in the aware and the unaware groups. For affective ratings the preconditioning ratings were compared to the postconditioning ratings for the CS pos , CS neg , and CS neut . If affective conditioning occurred, the CS pos should be rated more positively following conditioning, the CS neg rated more negatively, and CS neut should show no change. If affective conditioning occurred, the skin conductance responses to CS pos and CS neg should be larger than those to CS neut because skin conductance reflects sympathetic arousal but does not generally distinguish between positive and negative valence. If affective conditioning occurred, the startle response should be larger during CS neg than CS neut or CS pos and perhaps larger during CS neut than CS pos . If affective conditioning occurred, reaction times during affective priming should be greater for incongruent pairs than congruent pairs. All of these a priori hypotheses were first tested with one-tailed within-subject t-tests. Rom's sequentially rejective method was utilized to control Type I error for multiple t-tests whenever the set of t-tests for a dependent variable was nonorthogonal (Rom, 1990) . For all tests, the ␣ level was 0.05. An estimate of effect size (d; Cohen, 1988) was also calculated for all specific comparisons.
Because the absence of conditioning in unaware subjects was a major consideration in the present study, and because t-tests can result in low power compared with other techniques (Keselman, Wilcox, & Lix, 2003; Wilcox, 2005) , secondary robust statistical tests were also performed. t values can be highly sensitive to skew and the presence of outliers, in addition to differences between the means. One way addressing these problems is to use the Tukey and McLaughlin (1963) trimmed means method, which is readily applied to the present data. Under general conditions, the TukeyMcLaughlin method can have substantially higher power than t-tests; therefore it was also applied to the present data in addition to t-tests in order to provide a sensitive measure of conditioning.
Results
Awareness
Based on a combination of the postconditioning questionnaire and the trial-by-trial button measures described previously, there were 26 participants aware of the CS-UCS contingencies (18 females and 8 males) and 29 unaware of the contingencies (23 females and 6 males). Figure 2 shows the average changes in affective ratings of CS pos , CS neg , and CS neut from before to after the conditioning session for the aware and unaware participants. As can be seen, in the aware group the CS pos was rated significantly more positive following conditioning, t(25) ϭ 3.11, p Ͻ .005, d ϭ 1.24, and CS neg was rated significantly more negative following conditioning (t(25) ϭ 4.3225, p Ͻ .001, d ϭ 1.72), whereas affective ratings for CS neut did not change (t(25) ϭ 0.82, d ϭ 0.32). In contrast, there were no significant conditioned changes in affective ratings for any of the CSs in the unaware group (all ts Ͻ 1.0, all ds Ͻ .27). Figure 3 shows the mean skin conductance response to CS neg , CS pos , and CS neut for the aware and unaware participants. In the aware group, the mean response magnitudes to both CS neg and CS pos were significantly greater than the mean response to CS neut , t (25)ϭ 3.90, p Ͻ .001, d ϭ 1.56 and t(25) ϭ 3.39, p Ͻ .005, d ϭ 1.35, respectively, indicating conditioned orienting to the CS pos and CS neg stimuli. The mean magnitude of skin conductance responses to CS pos , CS neg and CS neut stimuli in the unaware group were not significantly different, failing to indicate that conditioning had occurred (all ts Ͻ 1.27, all ds Ͻ 0.50).
Affective Ratings
Skin Conductance During Conditioning
Skin Conductance During Preaware and Postaware Trials
The mean skin conductance amplitudes to the CS pos and CS neg were compared with the CS neut on the pre and postawareness pairs of trials in aware subjects. No differences were evidenced between the CS pos (M ϭ 0.12, SD ϭ 0.268), CS neg (M ϭ 0.05, SD ϭ 0.138) and the CS neut stimuli (M ϭ 0.03, SD ϭ 0.073) on the preaware trials (all ts Ͻ 1.0, all ds Ͻ .44). However, during the postaware trials the mean skin conductance magnitude for the CS pos (M ϭ 0.28, SD ϭ 0.299) and CS neg (M ϭ 0.25, SD ϭ 0.428) were both significantly greater for than the neutral stimuli (M ϭ 0.04, SD ϭ 0.102), t (12) ϭ 2.87, p Ͻ .01, d ϭ 1.65 and t (12) ϭ 2.13, p Ͻ .05, d ϭ 1.23, respectively. Thus, evidence of skin conductance conditioning was found only on the postaware trials.
Skin Conductance During Extinction
Skin conductance responses to CS pos , CS neg , and CS neut stimuli did not differ significantly in either the aware or unaware group in either the first half or the second half of the extinction trials, indicating that the conditioning that existed during the conditioning session in the aware group was quickly abolished by the extinction instructions (all ts Ͻ 1.36, all ds Ͻ .48). Figure 4 shows the mean startle eyeblink response magnitude to CS pos , CS neg , and CS neut in the aware and unaware groups during the first half of the extinctions trials. In the aware group, responses during CS neg were larger than responses elicited during CS pos and CS neut stimuli, t (15) 
Startle Eyeblink During Extinction
Affective Priming
The mean reaction times for the three types of stimulus pairs for the aware and unaware groups are displayed in Figure 5 . In the aware subjects, the difference between congruent and neutral pairs was significant, t(24)ϭ 2.38, p Ͻ .025, d ϭ 0.97, with faster reactions to the congruent pair, as predicted. The differences between incongruent and neutral pairs and between congruent and incongruent pairs were not significant, contrary to prediction, t(24)ϭ 1.40, d ϭ 0.57. For the unaware group, none of the differences were significant (all ts Ͻ 1.13, all ds Ͻ 0.45).
The reaction times of the unaware subjects shown in Figure 5 appear overall longer than those of the aware subjects. This was not a hypothesized effect and post hoc t-tests indicated that the differences were not statistically significant, t(50) ϭ 1.57, p Ͻ .26, two-tailed test.
Robust Statistical Analyses
As mentioned previously, because the consistent lack of successful evaluative conditioning in the unaware subjects is of particular theoretical importance in the present study, all statistical comparisons reported above with t-tests were repeated with the Tukey and McLaughlin (1963) trimmed means method. All results based on this more sensitive statistical method were in agreement with the t-tests in that conditioning was found in the aware subjects but not in the unaware subjects.
Discussion
The present results clearly and consistently demonstrated significant evaluative conditioning only in aware subjects based on changes in affective ratings, startle eyeblink responses, and affective priming, while skin conductance showed conditioned orienting responses only in aware subjects, and only after they became aware. No evidence of conditioning was found in the unaware subjects with any measure, neither self-ratings, psychophysiological measures, nor behavioral indices. Empirically, these results are consistent with a growing number of studies that have failed to find unaware evaluative conditioning (e.g., Lipp & Purkis, 2005; Pleyers, Corneille, Luminet, & Yzerbyt, 2007; Purkis & Lipp, 2001) . Theoretically, the results are consistent with models that state that contingency awareness is an essential facet of affective learning (Dawson & Furedy, 1976; Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Shanks & St. John, 1994) .
Some studies have claimed successful unaware evaluative conditioning (e.g., , but the methodology of these studies was critically reviewed by Field (2000) , who concluded that this claim is not warranted. One of the methodological issues noted by Field concerns the time interval between the assessment of conditioning and the assessment of awareness. The measure of awareness should ideally occur as close in time as possible to the acquisition of the conditioned response since intervening tasks, particularly those that involve unreinforced presentations of the CS, may weaken or cause to be forgotten awareness of CS-UCS contingencies that developed during acquisition. The study had one group of subjects for whom awareness was assessed after the subjects evaluatively rated a series of pictures, and it was in this group that some degree of evidence for unaware conditioning was reported. Another group that used the trial-by-trial measure of awareness did not show evidence of unaware conditioning, although it should be noted that there were very few unaware subjects in that group. As pointed out by Field (2000) , Fulcher and Cocks (1997) , who concluded that unaware subjects did not show evaluative condi- tioning, demonstrated that fewer subjects are rated as aware if a task, such as an evaluative rating of the CSs, intervenes between conditioning and the measure of awareness. More recently, Fulcher and Hammerl (2001) and Hammerl and Fulcher (2005) reported four evaluative conditioning studies (plus one backward conditioning study in which the UCS preceded the CS, which we will not discuss further). Three of those four studies had groups of subjects classified as "unaware," which were large enough to permit statistical tests. However, all three of these studies included subjects in the "unaware" group who were aware of a subset of the CS-UCS contingencies, and in two of the three studies the measure of awareness was taken following nonreinforced presentations of the CSs while affective ratings were obtained. These studies, therefore, do not unambiguously evaluate unaware evaluative conditioning. Our findings suggest that evaluative conditioning occurs only among subjects aware of the CS-UCS contingency. However, it should be noted that the evaluative conditioning paradigm differs from the traditional classical conditioning paradigm primarily in that biologically potent UCSs (e.g., shock) are used in the traditional paradigm, whereas less potent negative stimuli (e.g., unpleasant pictures or tastes) are frequently employed in evaluative conditioning studies. Nevertheless, the dominant finding in traditional conditioning is also that skin conductance conditioning only occurs among aware subjects when a sensitive trial-by-trial or postconditioning recognition measure of awareness is used (see reviews by Brewer, 1974; Dawson & Schell, 1985; Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Shanks & St. John, 1994) .
In contrast, at least three studies have reported unaware affective conditioning with the startle eyeblink measure, but not with skin conductance (Hamm & Vaitl, 1996; Weike et al., 2005; Weike, Schupp, & Hamm, 2007) . However, although a recognition questionnaire was used, the validity of the measure of awareness is suspect in these studies because it was administered following a series of unreinforced extinction trials rather than immediately following acquisition (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002) . Moreover, in two of the studies the recognition questionnaire was administered only after a lengthy interview , a procedure that has been shown to reduce the sensitivity of the recognition questionnaire (Dawson & Reardon, 1973) . The fact that each of these studies classified 25% or more of their college student subjects as unaware in and of itself suggests that the awareness measure was insensitive. A distracting masking task was not used in these studies (although it could be argued that the startle probes that were presented during CSϩ and CSϪ during acquisition might have been distracting to the subjects); rather, a single picture CSϩ was consistently followed by a shock UCS, while a second single CSϪ picture was never followed by shock. It is generally found that when only a single CSϩ and a single CSϪ are presented during conditioning without a distracting masking task, and when awareness is assessed with a recognition questionnaire immediately following conditioning, very few if any college student subjects are rated as unaware. As mentioned previously, contrary to these three studies, Purkis and Lipp (2001) and Jovanovic et al. (2006) found discrimination conditioning of the eyeblink only among aware subjects when a trial-by-trial measure of awareness was employed.
We believe that a distracting masking task coupled with either a trial-by-trial measure of awareness or a valid recognition postconditioning questionnaire administered immediately following the conditioning session is best suited for testing unaware conditioning (see Dawson & Reardon, 1973 , for the validation of a short recognition postconditioning questionnaire). It could be reasonably argued that a trial-by-trial measure of awareness creates awareness and therefore does not provide an appropriate context in which to test for unaware conditioning. However, while collecting pilot data for the present study we found that there was such an extremely low rate of awareness (14%) even with a trial-be-trial measure of awareness that it was necessary to add a verbal "hint" in order to get approximately half the subjects to become aware. Thus, the trial-by-trial measure of awareness used in the present distracting task did not create a high level of awareness.
It is possible that the absence of unaware evaluative conditioning was due to a specific aspect of our procedures. For example, giving subjects a "hint" that the UCS was predictable and requiring the use of buttons to express expectancy of the UCS might have induced an analytic mind-set that theoretically could have interfered with an unaware level of conditioning. However, it should be noted that many studies of traditional classical conditioning using a variety of procedures, including those that did not suggest to subjects that there might be a CS-UCS contingency, have found successful conditioning only among aware subjects (e.g., see review by Dawson & Schell, 1985) .
The present results also demonstrated dissociation between skin conductance and startle during the extinction phase. After subjects were told before beginning the extinction phase that there would be no more UCSs, the skin conductance index of conditioning that was present during acquisition no longer showed differential conditioning, whereas the startle index of conditioning did demonstrate conditioning. The fact that extinction instructions abolish skin conductance conditioning has been reported on other occasions (see review by Lovibond, 2004) , but the presence of startle eyeblink conditioning following these instructions is a new interesting demonstration of startle/skin conductance dissociation. This disassociation offers further support for the notion that the startle measure, unlike skin conductance, is at least partially independent of higher cognitive factors .
Another interesting aspect of the present startle data concerns the absence of significant startle modulation following CS pos . Previous studies that measured startle modulation during anticipation of pleasant and unpleasant pictures found larger startle during anticipation of both pleasant and unpleasant pictures compared with neutral pictures (Dichter, Tomarken, & Baucom, 2002; Lipp, Cox, & Siddle, 2001; Sabatinelli, Bradley, & Lang, 2001 ). In contrast, we found startle potentiation only in anticipation of the unpleasant UCS. This may be because our positive UCS (baby) was not as arousing as previously employed anticipated positive events.
The finding that startle magnitude is augmented during anticipation of arousing positive pictures as well as arousing negative pictures has important theoretical implications. Evaluative conditioning theory predicts that if a CS is associated with a positive UCS it then takes on the positive valence of the UCS; thus it is hypothesized that the startle eyeblink reflex will be inhibited during CS pos as it is during the positive UCS itself. However, it seems that startle magnitude during anticipation reflects the emotional arousal of the expected stimulus, not its hedonic valence, as suggested by Sabatinelli et al. (2001) . Consistent with this viewpoint, numerous studies have reported startle facilitation during warning stimuli at whose offset subjects must perform a perceptual task (see Rissling, Dawson, Schell, & Nuechterlein, 2005; Thorne, Dawson, & Schell, 2006 , for recent discussions of this issue).
Because startle may be influenced by arousal and attention as well as valence, the magnitude of the startle eyeblink may not be a valid physiological measure of the acquired valence of the CSs in classical conditioning.
If the prototypical picture-picture evaluative conditioning paradigm is not optimal for demonstrating unaware affective conditioning, is any paradigm likely to reliably demonstrate unaware conditioning? We believe that the biological preparedness of the CS-UCS contingency may turn out to be a critical factor in producing unaware conditioning (Ö hman & Mineka, 2001 ). For example, unaware conditioning has been reported in an evaluative conditioning paradigm that used flavors as CSs and UCSs (a flavor-flavor paradigm instead of a picture-picture paradigm).
In the flavor-flavor paradigm artificial flavors were used as CSs, while tasteful and distasteful substances were used as UCSs (Baeyens, Eelen, Van den Bergh, & Crombez, 1990) . One group of subjects drank 12 CSϩ/UCS compound fluids (e.g., a negative taste in an orange flavor drink) and 12 CSϪ/UCS compound fluids (e.g., a neutral taste in an apricot flavor drink) in quasi-random order. Subjects then evaluatively rated the flavors by tasting the various drinks without the UCSs and were found to rate the CSϩ flavor (e.g., orange) more negatively than the CSϪ flavor (e.g., apricot). At the end of the evaluative rating procedures, subjects were given five additional trials of CSϩ/UCS pairings. Finally subjects were given a recall questionnaire about the relationship between the flavors and the tastes, and they were given the opportunity to smell and/or taste the fluids if they wished to remind themselves of the stimuli, so the measure also had a recognition component for some subjects (Baeyens, personal communication, April, 28, 2006) . None of the subjects recalled the correct flavor associated with the negative taste. In fact, a puzzling aspect of these findings is that, while no subject identified the correct taste, a significant portion of the subjects wrongly identified the incorrect taste (11 of 24 subjects), whereas the remaining subjects identified an irrelevant feature such as color. Nevertheless, the flavor-flavor affective conditioning paradigm appears to offer stronger evidence for unaware conditioning than that obtained in the picture-picture paradigm (see review by Baeyens, Vansteenwegen, Hermans, & Eelen, 2001) .
Unaware autonomic classical conditioning has also been reported on several occasions with backwardly masked CSs that have biologically prepared associations with the UCS (e.g., CS pictures of snakes or angry faces paired with UCSs of electric shock). The purpose of the backward masking procedure is to prevent awareness of the CSs and therefore of the CS-UCS contingency. Esteves, Parra, Dimberg, and Ö hman (1994) found unaware conditioning with shock as the UCS and pictures of angry faces that were backwardly masked as CSs, but not with backwardly masked happy faces as the CSs. Likewise, Ö hman and Soares (1998) reported aversive conditioning with backwardly masked pictures of snakes and spiders but not with pictures of flowers and mushrooms, although both were paired with a shock UCS. Although these results suggest that contingency awareness is not necessary for aversive classical conditioning when the CS-UCS relationship is biologically prepared, they also confirm that awareness is necessary when the relationship is not biologically prepared.
Thus, it appears that unaware human affective conditioning may occur only under a very limited, although a theoretically important, set of stimulus conditions. However, when biologically prepared relationships (pictures of snakes and spiders paired with shock) were embedded in a "visual memory test" masking task similar to one used here, no unaware conditioning was found (Dawson, Schell, & Banis, 1986) . Therefore, unaware conditioning with biologically prepared stimuli seems to occur when the stimuli are backwardly masked, but not when they are embedded in a distracting task. This is a perplexing set of findings because the two methods of preventing awareness (backward masking vs. use of a distracting task) apparently produce different results. Further research is needed to disentangle these paradoxical results.
The weight of the evidence seems to suggest that awareness of the CS-UCS relation is necessary for human affective discrimination conditioning under the most common stimulus conditions, including those used in the picture-picture "evaluative conditioning" paradigm. This conclusion has broad implications. For behavioral theories of human affective conditioning it implies a need to incorporate concepts of conscious associative learning; for neurophysiological theories it implies the need to incorporate involvement of higher cortical centers; and for therapeutic applications of conditioning it implies the need to emphasize cognitive insight into stimulus relationships. Focusing exclusively on concepts of automaticity and subcortical circuits is insufficient to explain human affective conditioning in most situations. A complete theory of human affective conditioning requires an understanding of the interaction of controlled cognitive processes with automatic processes, as well as the interaction of cortical processes with subcortical processes.
The words of Donald Hebb (1958, p. 453 ) written nearly half a century ago are still applicable today: "Because a simple task could, theoretically, be handled by a simple mechanism does not mean in fact that the brain handles it that way. In an uncomplicated nervous system, yes; but in the complex brain of a higher animal other mechanisms may insist on getting into the act and turn a simple task into a complex one." In most situations human affective conditioning insists on being a complex task.
